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ABSTRACT 
With the advancement of multistakeholder collaboration as a governance principle in the 
global Internet Governance, how to investigate the political process in a ‘shared power’ 
environment emerges as a challenging methodological issue. 
In this paper, a synergetic theoretical approach is proposed to the study of Internet 
governance political process, which focuses on the concept of power, and crosses the 
boundaries of three academic fields, namely, Political Philosophy, Political Science and 
International Relations, and Organization Studies. This approach aggregates, in a descending 
analytical manner, concepts intrinsically linked to the contemporary shifting governance 
paradigm (i.e. governmentality, global governance, global public-policy networks, shared 
power, multistakeholder collaboration). In addition, such an approach brings the collaborative 
process into focus (rather than the decisions it leads to) by accentuating the productive 
potential of a collaboration based on the ‘shared power’ formula. Each of those theoretical 
reflections on shifting power relations provides building elements for a synergetic theoretical 
framework that can be, and has been, applied to the investigation of the emergent Internet 
governance regime. As a result, stakeholder alliances can be mapped, instances of power 
dynamics can be discerned, and some longitudinal tangible and intangible outcomes of the 
multistakeholder collaboration can be envisioned.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With the Internet becoming the 21st century global infrastructure for commerce and 
communication, a new regime of governance is emerging in the international 
communications field. This regime is sensitive to the medium’s architectural characteristics, 
the users’ norms of behaviour in Cyberspace, and the regulator’s (namely, the US 
government’s) potential to exert “soft power”. In this regime’s normative code, for the first 
time in international relations, inclusiveness, openness, transparency, and accountability are 
all attributes of authority. In this regime’s lexicon, ‘multistakeholderism’ is identified as the 
only legitimate way to develop the Internet regulatory environment, and ‘collaboration and 
consensus’ stay for the, admittedly, awfully messy and frustratingly slow deliberations. 
Moreover, the policy-making process, through which this regime is designed, empowers 
previously marginalized voices and allows the stakeholders to build coalitions of a global 
scale.   
The proliferation of fora discussing Internet governance issues1 makes it difficult to 
study this unconventional political process. For one thing, there are a large number of 
stakeholders (governments, international organizations, business corporations, non-
governmental organizations, experts and individual activists).2 How, as researchers, do we 
detect power dynamics in the network-like global multistakeholder formations? How do we 
assess a process of decision-making where legitimacy is vested in the ability to reach 
consensus? How do we account for the generated transformative energy in open deliberations 
on Internet development issues?  
The common denominator of all these questions, I propose, is the way we conceive 
power in a multistakeholder collaborative political process. Do we see power as anchored in 
structures (hence, power as domination and oppression), or as emanating from interactions in 
relational networks (hence, power as a ‘productive’ social environment)?   
                                                 
1 There are several expert bodies involved in the development and management of the Internet technical 
infrastructure and standards: among them are the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Society 
(ISOC), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The coordination of Internet-
related policies is discussed by a number of international organizations such as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In addition, the 
UN World Summit for the Information Society (WSIS) (2003-2005) and the first and second Internet 
Governance Forums (IGF) (2006 and 2007, respectively) provided fora for the consolidation of stakeholder 
interests and the evolvement of the normative environment for Internet governance. There are also regional and 
national bodies concerned with the creation and implementation of Internet policies. 
2 Consider, for instance, the second Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Rio de Janeiro (November 2007), 
where the number of participants who represented stakeholder organizations from 109 countries exceeded 1,300 
people (see http://www.intgovforum.org/Rio_Meeting/IGF2-Closing-15NOV07.txt , accessed December 7, 
2007). For comparison, in the first four years of the ICANN existence (1998-2002), there were only three-to-
four hundred active participants worldwide.  
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This paper reviews theories of power and develops a multilayered theoretical 
framework specifically developed for the study of the innovative multistakeholder 
collaborative process in Internet governance.3 Power and power dynamics are focal variables 
of the investigation. The theoretical framework proposed holds explanatory potential as it 
contains a comprehensive synthesis of theory pertaining to the contemporary political 
process; from inter-organizational to the global public policy level.  This approach is based 
on the fundamental Foucauldian understanding that, as a pervasive social dynamic, power 
animates the relationship of communication technologies and society. The 
communicative process in general, as well as each of its constitutive elements 
(communication technology and policy among others), cannot and should not be studied apart 
from the historically-specific power matrix.  
Indeed, in Foucault’s understanding of the political process, shifting social practices 
are constructed in and by historically specific matrices of power relations. Consequently, it is 
imperative that the deepest mechanisms of the political process are accounted for regarding 
the Internet’s emerging governance strategies and fluid practices.  
For this paper, power is conceptualized by employing three frameworks from Political 
Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, and Organization Studies.  As this 
paper will demonstrate, each of these perspectives provides key ideas for conceptualizing and 
studying power in a multistakeholder collaborative formation. Thus, the postmodern ontology 
of power (Political Philosophy) directs our attention to the shifting governmentality - from 
government-centered rationalities of governance to experimenting with multistakeholder 
collaboration. By reflecting analytically on real-world social trends, the globalization 
perspective on power (International Relations Studies) recognizes both the effectiveness and 
the legitimacy of a regime of ‘shared power’ global governance (national governments, 
businesses, and civil society advocates participate as equal in the policymaking process). 
Finally, the organizational approach to power in multistakeholder formations, where the 
dynamics of consensus-reaching practices are investigated, allows for the 
‘instrumentalization’ of power.  
The dialogue among concepts from those three perspectives, initiated in this paper, is 
an original contribution to the studies of power in multistakeholder collaboration. Instead of 
focusing exclusively on the most powerful stakeholders and their ability to influence the 
collaborative process, the suggested synergetic approach unfolds the process of consensus-
                                                 
3 This theoretical framework was successfully applied to the study of the multistakeholder collaborative process 
in ICANN (see Antonova, S., 2006). 
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building through mapping power dynamics and exploring the practices of learning and 
sharing of expertise and experiences.  As an experiment in global governance through 
multistakeholder collaboration, the Internet governance constitutes a rich empirical field for 
applying the constructed power dynamics theoretical framework. 
 
DEFINING INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
Internet governance is a contested terrain in contemporary global politics, as the UN World 
Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) (2002 – 2005) demonstrated. The principal 
stakeholders - national governments and international organizations, private corporations, 
civil society representatives, and Internet developers and operators - compete for 
reformulating the existing balance of power. Currently, the US government retains the 
unilateral control over the content of the Internet root zone that is at the core of the global 
Net, and a private corporation - ICANN – is mandated with the creation of a property rights 
regime in cyberspace. 
Yet, what is Internet Governance? Let’s begin with the observation that there is not a 
consensus on the definition of the term. The WSIS Working Group on Internet Governance’s 
(WGIG) formulation, developed after seven months of difficult negotiations4, was 
deliberately simple and descriptive. Internet governance was defined as “the development and 
application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of 
shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the 
evolution and use of the Internet” (WGIG, 2005). It was coupled with four clusters of issue 
areas, ranging from infrastructural issues and the management of critical Internet resources 
(admittedly, the most controversial area, because it pertained to the Internet addresses 
property rights in cyberspace), to the use of the Internet, and to the developmental aspects 
such as capacity building in developing countries.   
One could argue then that this first attempt to identify and define a new field of 
regulatory issues on a global level is more concerned with both making ‘multistakeholderism’ 
work and experimenting with consensus-reaching political process than with ‘mapping’ the 
emerging notion of Internet governance. Indeed, at the inaugural IGF (2006), some 
participants confided that the definition had not grasped the multitude of stakeholder 
                                                 
4 For insider views on the WGIG ‘bumpy’ road to developing the Internet Governance definition and 
recommendations, see William J. Drake (2005). 
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expectations and they felt uncomfortable with what governance meant when applied to 
Internet.5  
Thus, the very possibility of competing for participation and influence in the process 
of creating a global commons regime is a decisive advancement in the notion of Internet 
global governance based on multistakeholder collaboration principles. Moreover, 
stakeholders ‘sharing’ power in developing global commons regulatory regimes is an 
important operational principle in the developing regimes of international relations in the 21st 
century.  
In light of those developments, investigating power in collaborative formations and 
the power dynamics of the consensus process emerges as a challenging methodological issue.  
 
POSTMODERN ONTOLOGY OF POWER: RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 
Modern theories of power (i.e. the liberal, or judicial, theory, and Marxist theory) share a 
common epistemology: first, power is perceived as “enhancing the capacities of those who 
possess it and, consequently, in so far as it impinges on other persons, as an imposition on the 
freedom of those persons” (Hindess, 1996, p. 96), and, second, there is a common focus on 
the State as being endowed with power or exercising power for particular economic gains, 
and, more generally, on institutions and the people who rule them.  
Michel Foucault revolutionized the conventional view of power by proclaiming that a 
political power (sovereign) that rules on the basis of consent is simply one among a number 
of “rationalities of government”, and “therefore needing to be accorded no special analytical 
privilege” (Hindess, 1996, p. 98). As one of Foucault’s critics stated, he “almost single-
handedly… moved the discussion of that most elusive and illusive concept from its modern 
or state-centered understanding to a postmodern or decentered version” (Wolin, 1988, p. 
179). Along with shifting the ontology of power, Foucault introduced a liberating imagery of 
flowing interactions, productive networks of force relations, and endless possibilities of 
resistance and productive outcomes. 
For Foucault, power is omnipresent and pervasive, and it should be understood as a 
“multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their organization…and…as the strategies in which they take effect” (Foucault, 
1978, pp. 92-93). He hypothesized that power is “co-extensive with the social body”; that 
                                                 
5 At the inaugural IGF “Summing up” Session (November 1, 2006), a participant from Malaysia, for instance, 
stated that “the word ‘governance’ is one of the difficulties. We are struggling with the definition. We all have 
different definitions…. Every one of us has a different understanding, and therefore coming here with a different 
expectation” (IGF, 2006). 
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“relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, 
sexuality);  that “one should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, a 
binary structure with ‘dominators’ on one side and ‘dominated’ on the other, but rather a 
multiform production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible to integration 
into overall strategies”; and that “there are no relations of power without resistances” which 
are “multiple and can be integrated in global strategies” (Foucault, 1980, p. 142).  
To study elusive power relations, Foucault invented the neologism ‘governmentality’, 
which referred in a narrow historical sense to the distinctly new approach to governing, 
emerging in Europe from the sixteenth century, “which has as its target population, as its 
principal form of knowledge political economy” (Foucault, 1991, p. 102). In a more general 
way, though, ‘governmentality’ is conceived as “a way or system of thinking about the nature 
of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is 
governed)” (Gordon, 1991, p. 3); or, as the way in which thought both “operates within our 
organized ways of doing things” (Dean, 1999, pp. 17-18) (‘regimes of practices’) and “is 
embedded within programs for the direction and reform of conduct” (Dean, 1999, p. 18).  
Following Foucault, Mitchell Dean (1999) calls this particular approach to 
governmentality ‘analytics of government’ and explains that “to analyze mentalities of 
government is to analyze thought made practical and technical” (p. 18), and to assume that 
“government is accomplished through multiple actors and agencies rather than a centralized 
set of state apparatuses” (p.26).  
From the ‘analytics of government’ perspective, to grasp the logic of a particular 
‘regime of government’ is to map its governmentality; that is, to detect and identify the 
rationalities of government, which are embedded in dominant discursive and non-discursive 
practices. 
In light of Foucault’s ‘analytics’ of the liberal political reason, a number of authors in 
Political Science and Sociology have begun unraveling the neo-liberal governmental 
rationalities and newly-invented techniques of governance. A consensus has emerged that the 
neo-liberal governmentality, which rose to prominence under conservative governments in 
the 1980s, places emphasis ‘ upon the lives and decisions of individuals.    
Mitchell Dean, for instance, suggests that “the government through processes is 
increasingly displaced by a government of government, a ‘reflexive government’” (Dean, 
1999, p. 149), whose imperative is “to render governmental institutions and mechanisms, 
including those of the social itself, efficient, accountable, transparent and democratic by the 
employment of technologies of performance” (Dean, 1999, p. 193).  
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The governmentality school of research has been criticized, though, for its exclusively 
“programmatic orientation”, its emphasis on “broad governmental themes rather than specific 
neo-liberal projects” (Larner, 2000, p. 10). Yet, it has been recognized that the perspective of 
governmentality “deciphers the so-called ‘end of politics’ itself as a political programme” 
(Lemke, 2000, p. 10). As Lemke (2000, p. 11) comments,  
“the so-called ‘retreat of the state’ is in fact a prolongation of government, neo-
liberalism is not the end but a transformation of politics, that restructures the power relations 
in society. What we observe today is not a diminishment or a reduction of state sovereignty 
and planning capacities but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of 
government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. NGOs), that 
indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a new relation between state and civil 
society actors. This encompasses on the one hand the displacement of forms of practices that 
were formerly defined in terms of nation state to supranational levels, and on the other hand 
the development of forms of sub-politics ‘beneath’ politics in its traditional meaning.”  
As it is argued in the next section, contemporary globalization can be seen, indeed, as 
a well-guided governmental project exemplifying the neo-liberal governmentality in the late 
20th century. Coinciding with the commercialization of the Internet, this project is benefiting 
from both the global communication connectivity and the democratic instincts and aspirations 
of the so-called ‘civil society’. As a result, locally created forms of community self-
regulation are transplanted to the global level, and forums are inaugurated for collaboration 
on contentious issues in a diversity of problem-domains (Internet governance is one of them) 
with the participation of stakeholders from governments, businesses and non-governmental 
organizations.  
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE:  
POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
The Internet governance controversies are evocative of the 1990s’ ‘great globalization 
debate’6. This debate was concerned with the shifting matrix of power relations and the 
rearranging of the Industrial-age social organization in unstable hybrid configurations.7  
Through the ‘globalists’ optics, the contemporary globalization refers to the 
“entrenched and enduring patterns of worldwide interconnectedness”, and “represents a 
                                                 
6 See Held, D. & McGrew, A., 2000. 
7 See, for instance, Castells, M., 1996/1998; Falk, R., 1995; Strange, S., 1996; Offe, C., 1998. 
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significant shift in the spatial reach of social action and organization” (Held & McGrew, 
2000, p. 3) towards supranational scale.  
To this interpretation of the contemporary trends, the ‘sceptics’ oppose the view that 
“the discourse on globalization… is… an ideological construction” (Held & McGrew, 2000, 
p. 5) and argue that it provides “a convenient myth which, in part, helps justify and legitimize 
the neoliberal global project, that is, the creation of a global free market and the consolidation 
of Anglo-American capitalism within the world’s major economic regimes” (Held & 
McGrew, 2000, p. 5).  
Although exhibiting differing interpretations of contemporary social dynamics, the 
globalization debate correctly detects the changing paradigm of structural power relations on 
the supranational level. Thus, it has been broadly accepted that the centre of gravity in world 
politics has shifted, during the last quarter century, from the public agencies of the state to 
private bodies of various kinds, and from states to markets and market operators. Thus, 
escaping the state-centered concept, the academic discourse is entering the broader, and 
largely still in flux, field of global governance.  
In many respects, the notion of global governance draws upon the postmodern 
imagery of networks and flows as implying decentralization of power, proliferating 
connectivity, reconfiguration of relationships, and localization of resistance and 
empowerment (Manuel Castells’ theory of Network Society is a prime example here).  
In this imagery, global information networks are seen as related to the networks of 
power relations in three significant ways. First, according to Castells, in a network society, 
access to essential social networks (the Internet among them) equals enfranchisement in the 
society. Second, information networks replace earlier organizational forms.8 They are seen as 
changing both the quality of human experiences9, and “the way power is exercised and 
governance is organized in global politics” (Rosenau & Singh, 2002, p. 2). Third, because of 
their interactive nature, information networks “reconfigure, constitute, or reconstitute 
identities, interests, and institutions” (Rosenau & Singh, 2002, p. 13).  
In the publications focused on the concept of global governance, the predominant 
concern is, though, with formal, established global institutions, and the challenges to their 
effectiveness and accountability mechanisms.10  
                                                 
8 Castells postulates that “the Internet is the technological basis for the organizational form of the Information 
Age: the network” (Castells, M., 2001, p. 1). 
9 See Barney, D., 2004, pp. 60-68. 
10 See Rittberger, V., 2001; Reinicke, W. & Deng, F., 2000.  
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In contrast, James N. Rosenau (2000) proposed a broader approach to the term ‘global 
governance’, influenced by the Foucauldian concept of governance and governmentality. He 
conceived of global governance “to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – 
from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the 
exercise of control has transnational repercussions” (emphasis added) (Rosenau, 2000, p. 
181). From this the author concluded that “[g]lobal governance is the sum of myriad – 
literally millions – of control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures and 
processes… In terms of governance, the world is too disaggregated for grand logics that 
postulate a measure of global coherence” (Rosenau, 2000, p. 183).  
Apparently, in this broad understanding ‘global’ refers to the scope of political 
practices and effects, where the notion of uniformity is rejected. Indeed, diversity of 
arrangements can be expected, which “are more likely to evolve out of bottom-up than top-
down processes”, because they are “steering arrangements” emerging “through the shared 
needs of groups” and striving for legitimacy (Rosenau, 2000, p. 184).  
Drawing on cases exhibiting the growing tension between globalization and the 
state’s ability to govern, Reinicke and Deng (2000) propose that the strategy of global 
governance via mobilizing networks on a sectorial/functional basis provides the only 
effective governance alternative. In their view, global public-policy (GPP) networks are 
“effective, often remarkably so, in bringing together diverse and sometimes opposing groups 
to discuss common problems that no one of them can resolve by itself” (Reinicke & Deng, 
2000, p. XI), and they “represent a unique opportunity for governments to regain the 
initiative in the debate over the future of global governance” (Reinicke & Deng, 2000, p. 
XXI). 
To elaborate upon the global public-policy network model, Reinicke (1998) 
introduced the principle of horizontal subsidiarity (Reinicke, 1998, p. 89). As a political 
instrument, this principle helps to transfer part of policymaking responsibility to non-state 
actors, usually business representatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
rationale is that these actors, whose range of activity is not bound by a particular territory, 
“have direct stakes in the outcomes of a particular public policy” (Reinicke, 1998, p. 89). In 
addition, they possess better knowledge and understanding of the “increasingly complex, 
technology-driven” public-policy issues, which, in turn, “will generate greater acceptability 
and legitimacy for global public policy” (Reinicke, 1998, p. 90). As a characteristic feature, 
stakeholder inclusiveness lends legitimacy to the process and increases the chances of 
successful implementation of the policy outcomes.  
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Reinicke and Deng trace the potential long-term contribution of these entities to the 
formation of social capital and the constitution of a global public space. They notice that, by 
enabling shared knowledge and learning, these networks, in fact, engage in ‘capacity 
building’ for local communities, especially in developing countries, “to take democratic 
control over their destinies” (Reinicke & Deng, 2000, p. 64) 
For Reinicke and Deng, though, networks only complement the existing global 
governance institutions, and do not contribute to a ‘power shift’ away from governments and 
international organizations toward civil society and the private sector”. They have emerged 
“to address cutting-edge global challenges” and help the formal institutions to manage risk 
(Reinicke & Deng, 2000, p. 51). In this light, national governments, international 
organizations, and especially the UN agencies are advised to take the leadership in supporting 
this ‘quiet revolution’.  
Reinicke’s model provides valuable analytical support to the argument that alternative 
policy responses are needed, which are compatible with both, globalization’s scope and 
complexity, and the mechanics of the powerful global trend towards redistribution of power. 
Nonetheless, the global public policy network model does not account for the ‘shared power’ 
dynamics in a multistakeholder collaborative process.  
As discussed next, the possibility of an inclusive, deliberative mode of policymaking 
in a problem domain, from the local and national to the global level, requires both a more 
insightful understanding of the power dynamics in a collaboration, and skilful managing of 
the consensus-oriented negotiations. A number of conceptual constructs developed by 
Organization Studies scholars have already been probing the incentives and the outcomes of 
collaboration, mainly in business settings, but in hybrid multistakeholder alliances, as well.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE:  
COLLABORATION AS A MODE OF SHARED POWER 
So far, we have developed two layers of the conceptual model of power that the investigation 
of Internet Governance requires. First, in ontological terms, power emerges as a relational 
and ubiquitous phenomenon that is capable of producing effects/outcomes (i.e. discourses, 
institutions, knowledge, policies, structures, etc.). It is discernible in the webs of force 
relationships, where it produces both negative and positive outcomes. Second, in political 
terms, new socio-economic dynamics, grasped by such metaphors as Globalization and 
Information/Knowledge/Network Society, have induced a significant shift in the perceived 
balance of power on both national and global levels, and between national governments (and 
  12 
international organizations) and private actors (the ‘shared power’ formula). In response, new 
forms of alternative policymaking have emerged, which are designated as ‘global public 
policy networks’, in Political Science, and ‘collaborative formations’, in Organization 
Studies. 
Since the 1970s, a multitude of collaborative formations, functioning on the principle 
of ‘shared power’, have been convened mainly in the USA, on local, regional, and national 
levels. Consequently, the phenomenon of ‘collaborations’ or ‘collaborative alliances’11, or 
multistakeholder collaborative roundtables, in Canada12  has been an object of vigorous 
investigation by Organization Studies theorists.  
In the process, conceptual constructs have been redefined or invented, all pertaining to 
the realization of organizational interdependencies and collaborative advantages.13 
In response to the need for a more dynamic process-oriented mode of investigation in 
inter-organizational relations, Barbara Gray (1989) developed an empirical theory of 
(multistakeholder) collaboration. It combined perspectives of organizational behavior and 
political science, and departed from the traditional model of inter-organizational relations that 
had hitherto dominated the literature. Gray suggested that collaboration was enabling 
organizations to manage their increasing interconnectedness (Gray, 1989, p. 226). In a 
collaboration, stakeholders “constructively explore their differences”. The aim is “to create a 
richer, more comprehensive appreciation [common understanding] of the problem… than any 
one of them could construct alone” (Gray, 1989, p. 5), and resolve conflicts, or advance 
shared visions on the collective good (Gray, 1989, p. 5).14  
As Gray noticed, dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the desire to avert unwanted 
costs that it induces, constitute a major motivation for the principal stakeholders to turn to 
collaboration. There are stakeholders, though, who would be prompted to join a collaboration 
because of the attractive cultural norms it embodies (consensus decision-making vs. top-
down governmental regulation), or the credibility of the convening party(ies). Thus, the 
                                                 
11 See Gray, B. (1989); Gray, B. & Wood, D. J. (1991); Wood, D. & Gray, B. (1991). 
12 See Pasquero, J. (1991); Turcotte, M.-F. & Pasquero, J. (2001). 
13 Important conceptual steps in this process were the theory of inter-organizational relations (Evan, W., 1966); 
the concept of “organizational ecology” (Trist, E.,  1977);  the notion of turbulence as a “pervasive quality” of 
the “contextual environment” of organizations (Emery, F. & Trist, E.,  1965); the stakeholder theory of the firm 
(Mitroff, I., 1983); and the notion of ‘shared power’ in collaboration (in the early 1990s), defined, (after 
Giddens) as “shared transformative capacity exercised in interaction between or among actors to further 
achievement of their separate and joint aims” (emphasis in the original) (Bryson, J. M. & R. C. Einsweiler, 
1991, 3).  
14 C. Finn states, for instance, that collaboration is perceived in Organization Studies as a “fundamentally new 
public policy approach to understanding and dealing with issues that are larger than the capacity of any one 
actor or organization is able… to comprehend or deal with” (Finn, C., 1996, p. 152). 
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expectation that through collaborative efforts some positive outcomes would be produced is a 
powerful incentive for participation in a collaboration. 
In a “comprehensive theory of collaboration” (Wood and Gray, 1991), ‘collaboration’ 
was defined exclusively as a self-governance process: “Collaboration occurs when a group of 
autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared 
rules, norms and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain” (Wood & Gray, 
1991, p. 146). 
The comprehensive theory of collaboration links success with the participation of 
“those stakeholders… that are most interested in working collaboratively to solve a problem”; 
“the most powerful or influential stakeholders”; “the best organized networks of 
stakeholders… so that social pressure may be brought to bear on nonparticipants”, and, in 
principle, “the majority of stakeholders in a problem domain so that social norms can be 
established that pressure others to participate eventually” (Wood & Gray, 1991, p. 155). 
This theory is based on the assumption that collaboration, as a strategy for managing 
interdependencies, evokes political dynamics (stakeholders are anxious to advance their own 
interests), but operates in the mode of ‘shared power’ as accepted by all the participants.  
Power dynamics are observable in each phase of collaboration in multistakeholder 
deliberative formations. Still in the problem-setting stage, power dynamics are conditioned 
by the conveners, for they “define the nature of the problem” (Gray, 1989, p. 121), decide 
how to address it, “what actions will be taken with respect of solving it”, and even who will 
participate and in what forum the deliberations will occur. Conveners, themselves, derive 
power from both their ability to influence outcomes in the domain (through their expertise, 
resources, and links to legitimate authorities) and the credibility they have with other 
stakeholders (“perception of objectivity or bias”) (Gray, 1989, p. 126).  
As Gray infers, “[i]dentifying and selecting stakeholders to collaborate, in effect, 
circumscribes the boundaries of the domain and empowers a specific group to address the 
problem. The power of conveners, then, is the power to organize” (emphasis in the original) 
(Gray, 1989, p. 124). 
During the direction-setting phase, power dynamics emanate from control over both 
defining an agenda for the domain and determining the range of mutually acceptable 
solutions (power to strategize). The success of the consensus-building process in this stage 
depends exclusively on reaching agreement on how the stakeholders will interact with each 
other. This must be achieved in advance to the discussion of substantive issues in order to 
create trust among the stakeholders, and foster the sense of efficiency and effectiveness.  
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Consensus is recognized as the primary objective of a collaborative formation. In fact, 
the ability to achieve consensus justifies the multistakeholder collaborative process as a 
valuable power-sharing policy mechanism. Along with programs, regulative decisions or 
regimes (tangible outcomes), the multistakeholder collaborative process produces consensus, 
learning and innovation, which constitute its intangible outcomes. This realization suggests, I 
would argue, that collaborations can be interpreted not only as power-sharing forums, but as 
power-generating entities as well. Indeed, outcomes are deposits of transformative social 
energy, since the aim of a collaboration is to reconstitute a number of social relations in a 
particular problem domain.  
I would argue further that, when cast as a power-generating process, multistakeholder 
collaboration exhibits long-term and large-scale societal implications. Thus, the cumulative 
effect of a collaboration radiates on a number of levels (e.g., individual participants, 
constituencies, participating organizations, the domain, global interdependencies). It induces 
new structural relationships among a multitude of players (e.g., contractual and unofficial 
alliances), while stabilizing existing force relationships or engendering a network of new 
dependencies in a particular domain.  
In addition, learning and innovation enhance an organization’s capability to adapt to 
constantly shifting power networks.15  
As these outcomes are undefined and unstable, I contend that we can gain a better 
understanding of their transformative capacity by mobilizing the elements of the above-
presented theoretical framework. From the neoliberal governmentality of self-governance to 
the convener’s strategizing power in a collaboration – all these concepts can be fused in a 
coherent framework despite the fact that they greatly differ in analytical abstractness and 
belong to diverse fields of Social Sciences. This possibility arises when their focus on power 
is understood as being about interactive networks of power, which allows for identifying both 
instances of power dynamics and strategies of influencing the process. 
 
TOWARDS A SYNERGETIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
From the presented overview of contemporary interpretations of power, it can be inferred that 
the adoption of perspectives foregrounding decentralized and fractured authority offers 
analytical possibilities for those interested in theorizing Internet governance. Sharing a 
                                                 
15 Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen define this as ‘collaborative advantage’, a term that refers to the potential of 
inter-organizational collaborations “to achieve outcomes that could not be reached by any of the organizations 
acting alone” (Huxham, C. & Vangen, S., 2000, p. 1; see also Huxham, C. &. MacDonald, D., 1992; Huxham, 
C., 1996). 
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common concern with the contemporary shifting dynamics in governance (at global or inter-
organizational levels), the theories presented offer significant explanatory power when the 
focus of Internet governance  is on metaphors of networks, flows, shared power, 
interdependencies, and collaboration.  
Firstly, through Foucault’s optics of omnipresent power and government as action, the 
contemporary political rationalities and practices emerge as exemplifying a distinct trend 
towards fundamental redefining of statehood, of the relation between state, civil society, and 
the private sector. The shift in governance practices from an emphasis on the nation-state to 
broadening civil-society participation is conceived as a mechanism of globalizing local 
techniques of government, because their effectiveness is appreciated. The neoliberal 
rationality of self-governance in local settings (e.g. resolving environmental contingencies at 
local, national, and supranational levels) is now transplanted to the field of global 
governance.  
Secondly, according to scholars using Foucault’s perspective on power and 
government, contemporary globalization, which represents a shift in social action and 
organization towards the supranational level, is a governance project, and not simply an 
outcome of technological development. The neoliberal rationalities of government that 
espoused this project are characterized by a concern with performance and efficiency in 
governance, which substitutes for a concern with legitimacy. In Castells’ network society, 
government shares decision-making power with a number of players who bring their distinct 
expertise to the process. 
Thirdly, the invention of new organizational and institutional forms (i.e. global public 
policy networks) in response to these dynamics exemplifies the emerging ‘global 
governance’ mentality and order, which are based on a shared realization of the increasing 
level of interconnectedness and interdependencies of the world community. Nonetheless, this 
constitutes a particular challenge for political scientists. Besides the novelty of these 
phenomena, there is no suitable conceptual apparatus for investigation of ‘shared power’ 
dynamics, when governments are only one of the policymaking authorities.  
Fourthly, in this regard, Organization Studies marks a significant advancement in 
comprehending the collaborative nature of such formations and scrutinizing the power 
dynamics in a multistakeholder consensus process. Dealing with real-life inter-organizational 
initiatives, scholars in this field have accumulated knowledge about stakeholder 
interdependencies in an organizational domain, the phases in a collaborative process, power 
positions of different stakeholders, strategies for influencing the process and the outcomes.  
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And, fifthly, the microanalysis of power dynamics in collaboration allows for tangible 
and intangible outcomes to be detected and envisioned, and, hence, an argument to be 
developed that the accumulated transformative energy would lead to restructuring the 
relations in an organizational domain.  
It must be noted here, though, that not much evidence can be found that analytical and 
empirical results have been communicated across disciplinary borders, when collaborative 
governance processes are investigated at local (inter-organizational) or global (supra-
organizational) levels. In this sense, the present article contributes to the initiation of such a 
cross-disciplinary dialogue. By combining the ‘government rationalities’ perspective, which 
insists on contextualizing the techniques of government, with power-dynamic patterns in 
multistakeholder collaborations that have been detected and raised in Organization Studies, 
we can successfully apply this enriched, layered theoretical framework to the political 
process of Internet governance formations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The present paper constitutes a journey through the territories of three social-science fields in 
order to investigate the conceptualization of ‘power’ in each of them and consider the explicit 
and potential conjunctions, which provide for the creation of a theoretical framework for the 
investigation of the Internet governance field. It can be concluded that the above presented 
conceptual developments were inspired by a real shift in the public-policy regime - from the 
kind of unequal distribution of power associated with representative democracy to a more 
accessible, inclusive and collaborative decision-making process. 
It has been argued that the creation of hybrid public/private or purely private 
authorities for Internet governance (for the latter, consider ICANN) is an experiment in 
advancing a public-policy alternative to the global level – multistakeholder collaborative 
formations functioning on a consensus basis.  
To investigate this alternative form of governing global resource, a multidisciplinary 
conceptual matrix was presented, which allows for a sharper profile of the power dynamics of 
the process, for deeper insights into the transformative potential of the stakeholder 
collaboration, and, overall, for more conclusive results from the experiments in Internet 
governance. 
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